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A Moment in The Times: Law
Professors and the Court-Packing Plan
Kyle Graham
From a letter to Charles E. Clark, dean of the Yale Law School:
August 28, 1935
Dear Charlie:
You are a sap and you know it. You have got to make up your mind some
time whether you want to lead the life of action or the life of scholarship.
You might as well do it now ....
-Robert M. Hutchins'
In the mid-1930s law teachers found themselves at a professional cross-
roads. Over the past fifty years they had promoted legal education from the
trade school to the university by casting their work as a "scientific" endeavor.
But by the thirties the idea of "scientific" legal study had taken on so many
meanings that it had become almost meaningless. Moreover, some among a
new generation of law teachers-the legal realists-were attacking the
Langdellian concept of scientific legal study as sterile and ineffective. At the
same time, the Great Depression was snuffing out a "scientific" approach that
emphasized empirical research. The writing was on the wall: the profession
could no longer rally around abstract scientific principles to organize or
promote itself. But what would replace law teachers' perceived affiliation with
and service of their "science" as a source of influence, prestige, and profes-
sional meaning?
The path taken connected the law school to the outside world. In the 1930s
law teachers leveraged the respect they had cultivated as "scientists" to move
beyond law journals and law-reform commissions and assume a more visible
and direct role in influencing public opinion on controversial issues. The
authors who have discussed the development of the law professor as a public
figure have focused principally on the government service of Felix Frankfurter
and his disciples and the legal realists who took part in Franklin Roosevelt's
Kyle Graham is a law clerk to William Alsup, judge of the United States District Court for the
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New Deal.' Frankfurter and the realists were indeed groundbreakers, being
among the first academics to span the divide between Max Weber's Science as
a Vocation and Politics as a Vocation. But with the notable exception of
Frankfurter himself, even these individuals, who hopped back and forth
between the academy and government, did not make the professor a public
man; rather, to become public figures teachers had to leave the ivory tower
behind (if only temporarily, in some cases). Punditry, rather than government
service, would ultimately prove the better means of making the law professor a
public figure. And a single affray-the controversy surrounding Franklin
Roosevelt's court-packing plan-was crucial in convincing law teachers that
this manner of engagement with popular controversies could and indeed
should become part of theirjob description.
The court-packing proposal directed unprecedented and unmatched atten-
tion to the nation's law teachers. More important, it forced a difficult decision
upon many academics who considered close association with partisan stances
to be unbefitting a disinterested scientist. A number of these same professors
detested the court-packing plan. Publicly denouncing the proposal would
moderate perceptions of their profession's political leanings while (they hoped)
sinking the plan besides. To speak out, however, meant abandoning a spiritual
dichotomy between the Man of Science and the Man of Politics.
The decision proved surprisingly easy. The court-packing plan was so
abhorred, and the idea of legal study as a disinterested science so drained of
any limiting force, that droves of law teachers left the library for the agora.
This episode shifted the fulcrum of the seemingly eternal debate over the
propriety of direct professorial engagement in political affairs. Because of
their involvement in the court-packing debate, a critical mass of law teachers
understood they could exert influence in partisan controversies without nec-
essarily threatening their hard-earned place as recognized experts in law. This
answered some questions about the profession's direction, while provoking
new ones that remain unanswered even today. Indeed, the battle lines traced
by Frankfurter and Warren, Wigmore and Green, Arnold and Corbin are the
same as those now paced by the likes of Neal Devins3 and Cass Sunstein4 in
their debate over activism in today's legal academy.'
Prologue
The law teacher of the 1800s was a public man. Often a retired judge or
practicing lawyer, he taught law on the side or as a second careern' This began
to change with the appointment of James Barr Ames to the Harvard Law
2. See, e.g., Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainty: Elite Lawyers in the New Deal 131-57
(Durham, 1995).
3. Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 165 (1999).
4. Professors and Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 191 (1999).
5. See Stephen M. Griffin, Scholars and Public Debates: A Reply to Devins and Farnsworth, 82
B.U. L. Rev. 227 (2002); Ward Farnsworth, More Tales Out of School: A Reply to Professor
Griffin, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 281 (2002); Neal Devins, Mistnderstood, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 293 (2002).
6. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The
Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35J. Legal Educ. 311, 315 (1985).
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School faculty in 1873. Ames was the first full-time law teacher who had never
previously practiced law.7 And as the 1800s segued into the 1900s, a discrete
professional class of law teachers began to develop. They organized them-
selves and used "hard work and effective propaganda" to secure a place in the
American university.8 They characterized their work as a science and them-
selves as scientists.' Where other scientists had the lab, they had the library.
This campaign proved successful in securing law teachers a place in Ameri-
can universities influenced by German scientism.' But if there ever was a
common understanding as to what legal science was and should be, a dubious
supposition in the first place, as of the late 1920s those days were long gone.
And as boom times gave way to bad, more and more cracks began to show in
what had been for two generations the profession's framing ideal. By the
1930s the most successful approach to "scientific" legal study had taken on
unsavory meanings in some quarters. In a provocative article Jerome Frank
argued that Christopher Langdell's spirit had "choked legal education" by
insulating it from the realities of actual legal practice. Other, more modern
forms of "scientific" legal study took a body blow from the Great Depression,
as fiscal woes doomed the most ambitious schemes for empirical legal re-
search. 2 The Depression also forcefully reminded law teachers that while
exhaustive studies might bring them plaudits, teaching students paid the
bills.'" Finally, few who witnessed the corruption of Germany's legal regime at
the Nazis' hands were encouraged to find the baseline similarities across legal
cultures contemplated by certain groups of law teachers. 4
As scientism waned, a reformist impulse waxed. Beginning around the turn
of the century, law teachers began to participate in law-reform commissions
and other efforts to improve the legal system. 5 This brought jurists into
contact with politics, but generally in an advisory role not much different from
that of the political scientists, botanists, and other academics also tapped for
their expertise during the Progressive Era. This sort of contribution toward
7. Howard Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 Law & Hist. Rev. 421, 462 (1999).
8. Schlegel, supra note 6, at 315.
9. See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s at
134 (Chapel Hill, 1983);Jerold Auerbach, UnequalJustice 85 (NewYork, 1976).
10. See Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A History 333-34 (Athens,
Ga., 1990) (1962); Schlegel, supra note 6, at 321.
11. What Constitutes a Good Legal Education? 19 A.B.A.J. 723, 724-25 (1933). See alsojerome
Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907 (1933).
12. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science 114 (Chapel
Hill, 1995).
13. For example, student tuition, fees, and dormitory rent provided just 46 percent of Yale Law
School's overall revenue for the 1930-31 academic year, but 58 percent of its revenue in
1936-37. Yale University, Report of the Treasurer and Associate Treasurer and Comptroller
of Yale University 190-91 (New Haven, 1931); Yale University, Report of the Treasurer and
Associate Treasurer and Comptroller of Yale University 148-49 (New Haven, 1937).
14. Kyle Graham, The RefugeeJurist and American Law Schools, 1933-1941, 50 Am.J. Comp. L.
- (2002).
15. Auerbach, supra note 9, at 81.
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perfecting the legal order was easily squared with the law professor's embrace
of Science as a Vocation. "
Starting no later than the 1920s, however, law teachers also began to direct
differently toned arguments toward a larger audience. At Harvard Law School
Roscoe Pound, Zechariah Chafee, and Felix Frankfurter publicly denounced
infringements on civil liberties during the Red Scare of the early 1920s. 7
Frankfurter frequently commented on political matters in The New Republic,
including but not limited to endorsements of presidential candidates." In
1927 Frankfurter stepped even further into the limelight by writing an Atlantic
Monthly article critiquing the trial of Italian anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti, as
well as a book on the subject.' Other law teachers seconded Frankfurter; their
views, too, attracted notice." And when Northwestern's John Wigmore, the
dean of evidence, publicly took issue with Frankfurter's position, their ex-
change (originally printed in the Boston Evening Transcript) became nation-
wide news.2 But Sacco-Vanzetti was a trial, and trials eventually end. By 1928
the luckless immigrants had been executed and law teachers had, in the main,
returned to the business of more discreetly influencing the legal and social
order through training the next generation of lawyers, writing law review
articles and treatises, and making occasional contributions to law-reform
commissions and drafting committees preparing new legislation.2 2
Five years later came Roosevelt's New Deal. From its outset the Roosevelt
administration recruited law professors to design and operate the bureau-
cratic machinery that pushed this program forward. Faculty from Harvard,
Columbia, Yale, and other schools were enlisted; many volunteered . 2 1 One
New Haven newspaper article in October 1933 spoke to the exodus of Yale
Law School teachers to Washington with the headline "Administration Rely-
ing on Law Faculty So Much in Solving Problems of Idle, Suggestion Has Been
16. See id. at 85.
17. Joel Seligman, The High Citadel 58-59 (New York, 1978).
18. G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter, the Old Boy Network and the New Deal: The Placement
of Elite Lawyers in Public Service in the 1930s, 39 Ark. L. Rev. 631, 650 (1986).
19. The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, Atlantic Monthly, March 1927, at 409; The Case of Sacco and
Vanzetti: A Critical Analysis for Lawyers and Laymen (NewYork, 1962) (1927). Frankfurter's
article is discussed in G. Louis Joughin & Edmund M. Morgan, The Legacy of Sacco and
Vanzetti 253 (New York, 1948).
20. Criticises Handling of Case, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1927, at 3; Yale Liberals Defend Sacco and
Vanzetti, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1927, at 23.
21. Joughin & Morgan, supra note 19, at 260-62; Wignore Defends Sacco Convictions, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 1927, at 19.
22. Within law reviews, of course, professors often commented on current legislative proposals
and other topical issues. See, e.g., Members of Chicago Univ. Law Faculty, Comment,
LimitingJurisdiction of Federal Courts-Pending Bills, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1932).
23. Foundation for Research in Legal History, A History of the School of Law, Columbia
University 336-37 (New York, 1955); Law School, Official Register of Harvard University,
Feb. 29, 1936, at 193, 196; Yale Experts Playing Vital Roles in Recovery Program, New Haven
Register, Oct. 1, 1933, at 7 [hereinafter Yale Experts]; Robert Gordon, Professors and Policy-
Makers: Yale Law School Professors in the New Deal, Address in History of Yale Law School
Series (Feb. 20, 2001).
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Made School Be Moved to Capital. '24 Realist law teachers also made the case
for the Roosevelt program through receptive forums such as The New Repub-
lic. 2
5
These law teachers were alternately fascinating to, and held in suspicion by,
professional politicians and the general public. Their contributions to the
New Deal made them a center of attention, and occasionally controversy. 26 But
their service did little to change the profession's attitude toward political
engagement. Outside of Harvard, Yale, and a few other schools, relatively few
faculty actively participated in the New Deal. And when their contributions
grew to more than writing an appellate brief or offering informal advice, they
often had to take a leave of absence from their academic duties.2 7 In other
words, professors were not marrying science and politics; they were choosing
between the two, depending on the semester. Furthermore, law teachers
involved with the New Deal often wondered whether their academic robes
tripped them up in the court of popular opinion, i.e., whether their professo-
rial opinions carried weight. Even the most effervescent Roosevelt supporters
shared this concern; for example, after proposing a farm-relief plan in the
pages of the Yale Review in 1933, Thurman Arnold wrote Yale University
president James Angell with his concern that "there is a growing hostility in
Washington towards professors' schemes and we are inclined to believe that
the less publicity we have, the more chance we will have of getting some of our
ideas across.
28
The contributions of these predominantly liberal jurists to the New Deal
also produced a backlash on campus. 29 Some law teachers, echoing Weber and
clinging to older versions of the scientific ethic, believed that overt political
action threatened the law school's reputation as a disinterested body of
scholars. Even those who understood law as a social institution considered
themselves obliged to foster a perception of nonpartisanship. Making the
situation worse, many who regarded the New Dealers' actions as professionally
24. Yale Experts, supra note 23.
25. See, e.g., Thurman Arnold, The New Deal Is Constitutional, New Republic, Nov. 15, 1933, at
8; Charles Clark, The Supreme Court and the N.R.A., New Republic,June 12, 1935, at 120.
26. Many New Dealers became minor celebrities. Intimate biographical sketches of Landis,
Frank, and Frankfurter can be fotund in The Unofficial Observer [pseudonym of John
Franklin Carter], The New Dealers (NewYork, 1934).
27. See, e.g., School of Law, Bulletin of Yale University--Supplemental Reports of the Dean and
of the Librarian of the School of Law for the Academic Year 1934-35 at 10-11 (New Haven,
1935).
28. Letter from Thurman Arnold toJames Angell (Mar. 27, 1933) inAngell Papers, supra note 1,
Folder 1250, Box 121. Somewhat similarly, later that same year Yale's Edwin Borchard and
Columbia's Karl Llewellyn thought of circulating a petition admonishing the German gov-
ernment for its persecution of Jews. But, doubting that a petition signed by law teachers
would have much effect anyway, they abandoned their plan upon learning of the production
of a similar statement by a group of social scientists. Letter from Edwin Borchard to Karl
Llewellyn (May 1933) (Yale University Archives, Edwin Borchard Papers [hereinafter Borchard
Papers], Folder 352, Box 31, Series II); Llewellyn to Borchard (July 13, 1933) (in Borchard
Papers, Folder 357, Box 31, Series II); Borchard to Llewellyn (Aug. 11, 1933) (in Borchard
Papers, Folder 357, Box 31, Series II).
29. Shamir, supra note 2, at 133.
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improper were also opposed to the Roosevelt program. And so men like
Arthur Corbin shuddered when Frank, a part-time teacher at Yale and one of
the most prominent jurists in the Roosevelt administration, took to the po-
dium at the 1933 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
and praised "experimental" lawyers who are "committed not to mere de-
tached study but are devoted to action on the basis of their tentative judg-
ments."" '" They no doubt cringed even more when Frank's remarks were
reprinted for the world in the CongressionalRecord.
Just a year later Frank (recently ousted from the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration) was being considered for a permanent appointment at Yale.
Corbin wrote the school's executive committee in opposition: "It seems prob-
able to me that as a member of a law faculty he would always occupy an
exaggerated place as its assumed public representative, and that ambition to
fill such a place would make him less contented and less useful as a working
professor of law.""' Corbin was one of few professors to give vent to his
grievances with politically active colleagues, but others felt the same. Some
jurists still believed that legal study was a scientific endeavor that did not mix
with political activism-at least not quite so publicly. But as the 1930s pro-
gressed and the Depression raged on, neither the New Deal nor law teachers'
engagement with it showed any signs of winding down. Continued conflict
within the academy seemed inevitable. On the one side stood politically active
law teachers who wondered whether the public truly valued their input; on the
other were those who saw entanglement with political controversies as erod-
ing their profession's hard-earned reputation for objectivity.
The Plan
Then in February 1937 Roosevelt unveiled what would become known as
his court-packing plan. Relations between his administration and the Su-
preme Court had been tense since long before Roosevelt announced his plan.
Law reviews were replete with proposals to solve the impasse between an
administration and a Congress that continually enacted progressive legisla-
tion and a Supreme Court that often struck those laws down.3 As announced,
the plan (whose principal designer was not a law school professor but rather
Princeton's Edward Corwin) provided that the president could add a new
federal justice or judge when a sitting justice or judge of at least ten years'
service had waited more than six months to resign or retire after turning
seventy. The program, if approved by Congress, would allow Roosevelt to
counterbalance the votes of the Supreme Court's "four horsemen."
30. Jerome Frank, Experimental Jurisprudence and the New Deal, Address Before the Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Dec. 30, 1933, in 31 Handbook of the
Ass'n of Am. Law Schools 101 (1934). Reprinted in 78 Cong. Rec. 12412 (1934).
31. Arthur Corbin to Members of the Executive Committee, Yale Law School (Feb. 8, 1935) (in
Angell Papers, supra note 1, Folder 1252, Box 121).
32. For a list of law review articles about this split, see Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary:
Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Seventy-fifth Con-
gress, First Session, on S. 1392, A Bill to Reorganize the Judicial Branch of the Government,
75th Cong. 1878-80 (1937); Osmond K. Fraenkel, What Can Be Done About the Constitu-
tion and the Supreme Court? 37 Colum. L. Rev. 212 (1937).
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The press and public immediately grasped the significance of Roosevelt's
proposal. As one historian recently (though admittedly before the Clinton
impeachment) wrote, "FDR's message generated an intensity of response
unmatched by any legislative controversy of this century."33 The plan was the
lead story in the New York Times the day after it was unveiled. 4 The paper's
coverage of the plan that day included reactions from former president
Herbert Hoover, members of Congress, and Frederick Stinchfield, president
of the American Bar Association. 5 Also, tucked away on page 9, the Times
carried a brief one-column article entitled "Law Professors Divided," which
summarized the views of several Chicago-area law teachers. 6
The story did not end there. During February and March the controversy
surrounding the plan continued to swell. The media, both guiding and
guided by public interest, provided extensive coverage. Law teachers' percep-
tions were often discussed. Progressive jurists supportive of Roosevelt got off
some of the first shots in the press. 7 Other articles focused on the close splits
of opinion within the law faculties of Cornell" and Columbia. 9 Meanwhile,
the ABA was rapidly fostering, with great success, a perception that the
nation's practicing attorneys unanimously opposed the plan.4"
The ABA campaign, along with the history of professorial engagement in
the New Deal, made every law teacher who supported the plan stand out in
sharp relief. It became received wisdom that a disproportionate number of law
faculty supported the proposal.4' "I am not aware of any available statistics
showing the number or proportion of law school teachers who were for or
against the proposal," wrote one lawyer (Eustace Cullinan) in a California
33. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the
Age of Roosevelt 134 (NewYork, 1995).
34. Arthur Krock, Roosevelt Asks Power to Reform Courts, Increasing the Supreme Bench to 15
Justices; Congress Startled, But Expected to Approve, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1937, at 1.
35. Aim to Pack Court, Declares Hoover, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1937, at 1; Comment by Members of
Congress on Court Proposal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1937, at 9; Bar Head Attacks Court Proposal,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,1937, at 9.
36. Law Teachers Divided, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1937, at 9.
37. See, e.g., Roscoe Steffen, Favoring theJudiciary Plan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1937, at 16; Hail
Plan at Yale Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1937, at 30.
38. Cornell Law School Divided on Proposal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1937, at 6.
39. Law Class Backs Change in Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1937, at 10.
40. Auerbach, supra note 9, at 196. On February 18, 1937, the ABA's Board of Governors
authorized a referendum of the association's 29,616 lawyer-members concerning the pro-
posal. Eighty-six percent of the 18,965 who returned their ballots opposed Roosevelt's plan as
it pertained to the Supreme Court (the question of adding judges to the lower courts was
asked separately and did not produce so great a majority). The ABA also undertooka poll of
all lawyers nationwide. It sent out 142,320 ballots and received slightly more than 50,000
responses. Of these, 77 percent opposed Roosevelt's plan insofar as it pertained to the
Supreme Court. Reorganization of the FederalJudiciary: Hearings Before the Committee on
theJudiciary, supra note 32, at 1458-60 (1937) (statement of Sylvester C. Smith, chairman of
the Special Committee to Present the Views of the American Bar Association on the President's
Proposals with Reference to the Supreme Court).
41. Cf. Topics of the Times, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1937, at 24 (discussing professorial support for
the plan and contrasting it with practicing attorneys' opposition).
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State BarJournal article tellingly entitled "Has the Full-Time Law Professor Got
What It Takes?" Nevertheless, that practicing attorney surmised, "much of the
support for the proposal within the profession came from the teaching branch
and it seemed to me that most of the law-school professors who were vocal on
the subject favored the proposal." Needless to say, the author did not support
the plan and was not swayed by academics favoring it: "[T] his generation of
law teacher has been pastured on the sheltered college campus and has never
had to forage on the unfenced and overcrowded range. If he has gained
something thereby he has also missed something. Hisjob is to fit youth for life
on the range. But has he got what it takes?"'
Conservative professors were appalled. They seemed among the least likely
academics to take the public stage. But in this case they had powerful reasons
for stepping out of the shadows. At stake, as alumni letters reminded them,
was nothing less than their profession's reputation.43 And so, not long after
the court-packing plan was announced and their colleagues rose up in sup-
port, they took novel measures to make their own opinions known. Some
made the conditions calling them to the front perfectly clear. At the outset of
an open letter critical of the proposal that he cowrote with fellow Harvard Law
professors Morton Campbell andJoseph Warren, Edward Warren explained:
The common impression is that the bulk of the Harvard law school faculty
is in favor of the President's proposal. This is partly due to the fact that Prof.
Frankfurter has been a prominent advisor to the President. It also is partially
due to the fact that Dean-Designate Landis has spoken in favor of the
proposal. He did not in so doing assume to state anything but his personal
views, and yet there is an inescapable tendency for the public to think of him
in his capacity as the new dean and to draw the conclusion that his views are
the views of the faculty.
The impression thus created is very much regretted by many members of
the faculty, who feel we are in a false position before the public. Most of us are
very hesitant to talk in public on questions of burning public interest lest
statements made by us as individuals should be taken as corporate statements.
But it is clear to us that a false impression has arisen and is widespread in the
minds of the public and that it should be corrected.4
Other teachers at Harvard"5 and faculty at the University of Chicago"' and
Northwestern47 also issuedjoint statements to the press denouncing the plan.
42. 12 State B.J. 137, 137-38 (1937).
43. See, e.g., Letter from 11. L. Wessling, president, Northwestern University Club of Chicago, to
John Wigmore (Mar. 24, 1937) (Northwestern University Archives, John Wigmore Papers,
Folder 8, Box 119).
44. William Fulton, Harvard's Law Faculty Split over New Deal, Chi. Trib.,Jan. 16, 1939, at 4. The
letter was published in about a dozen papers across the country. E. H. Warren, Campbell,
Joseph Warren, See Court Plan Greatest Issue but War Ever Before U.S.; System at Stake,
Hav. Crimson, Mar. 22, 1937, at 1.
45. 18 at Harvard Oppose Court Plan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1937, at 2 [hereinafter 18 at Harvard].
The signatories were Samuel Williston, Sidney Post Simpson, Edward Warren, Edward
Thurston, Joseph Warren, Ralph Baker, George Gardner, Eldon James, Morton Campbell,
Joseph Beale, James Thayer, Erwin Griswold, William McCurdy, John Maguire, Warren
Seavey, Livingston Hall, Barton Leach, and Sheldon Glueck.
46. Chicagoans Rally for Court Defense, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1937, at 6.
47. N.U. Professors Fight Roosevelt Court Scheme, Chi. Trib., Mar. 24, 1937, at 7.
HeinOnline  -- 52 J. Legal Educ. 158 2002
Law Professors and the Court-Packing Plan
Still others elsewhere responded to media invitations to voice their opinions.48
Given the exigencies of the situation, law teachers were abandoning law
reviews-where an article's partisan thesis could be defended as merely the
inevitable conclusion of the "scientific" study that preceded it-for the popu-
lar press, where they stood a much greater risk of being perceived as partisans
first, scientists second.
Law teachers also marched en masse to Congress. Beginning in March, the
Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on Roosevelt's proposal. Of the
approximately eighty witnesses called, almost one-fifth were law teachers. Out
of these, only two (three if you include William Draper Lewis of the American
Law Institute) spoke in favor of the plan.49 A dozen others, including Colum-
bia dean Young B. Smith, Harvard's Erwin Griswold, Michigan's Henry Bates,
and Yale's Edwin Borchard, were opposed.5" Politicians considered law profes-
sors to be among the plan's most compelling critics; teachers, along with
religious and farm leaders, were given some of the precious final witness slots
as the hearings drew to a close.5' Local media gave the teachers' appearances
extensive coverage. 5
2
While faculty on both political extremes acted quickly and publicly, the
profession as a whole struggled over how best to express their opinions, if at
all. On February 28 the AALS proposed a nationwide poll of law teachers,
much like the ABA's canvass of American lawyers. According to the AALS
secretary, "several member schools have expressed themselves as strongly
desirous that such a poll be taken. '5' The AALS asked member schools to
approve or reject the idea of a poll while also (in the interest of time)
submitting their faculty's vote on the court-packing proposal itself. During
March the schools voted. In all, forty-three schools voted in favor of a poll and
thirty-four against. On April 1 it was reported that, given the closeness of the
vote, and the fact that "[n]o school in favor of a poll has expressed any
particular enthusiasm for it," the survey would not continue.
54
48. See, e.g., Edwin Borchard, Statement on Supreme Court Measure Prepared for the Christian
Science Monitorat Its Request, Feb. 1937 (in Borchard.Papers, supra note 28, Folder 1349, Box
143, Series V, RG 670).
49. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
supra note 32, at 225, 283, 305 (statements of Leon Green, dean, Northwestern University
Law School; Thomas Konop, dean, Law School of the University of Notre Dame; and Lewis).
Dean Charles Clark of Yale also submitted a statement supportive of the proposal, though he
did not testify. Id. at 1872.
50. Id. at 715, 760, 823, 885, 1009, 1131, 1251, 1283, 1413, 1441, 1717,1757 (statements ofYoung
Smith, Erwin Griswold, Edwin Borchard, Henry Bates, Frank Sommer, Ignatius Wilkinson,
William Cain, William Masterson, Linus Lilly, Paul Shipman Andrews, Edward T. Lee, L.J.
TePoel).
51. 400 Wish to Appear Against Court Bill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1937, at 4.
52. E.g., Court Bill Invalid, Borchard Tells Hearing, New Haven Evening Register, Mar. 31, 1937,
at 1.
53. H. W. Arant to Members of the Association of American Law Schools (Feb. 28, 1937)
(Northwestern University Archives, Leon Green Papers [hereinafter Green Papers], Folder
1, Box 34).
54. H. W. Arant to Members of the Association of American Law Schools (Apr. 1, 1937) (in
Green Papers, supra note 53).
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The dampened enthusiasm likely was due to two factors. First, upon further
reflection both opponents and supporters of the plan probably saw that they
had much to lose from a professionwide survey. Those who opposed the plan
knew it would be hard to match the near-unanimous vote reported by the
ABA; proponents may have believed that they were outnumbered even within
the academy. Second and more important, law teachers had no idea whether
the poll, as designed, would adequately reconcile individual professors' bur-
geoning interest in making their feelings known with an equally strong desire
to maintain an appearance of institutional indifference. The devil was in the
details. How would the poll's results be tabulated and announced-by school,
or nationwide? Would it be revealed how each person had voted? These sorts
of questions caused the Yale law faculty to initially vote against participating,
then to change their minds and tentatively agree (on a divided vote) to
postpone any decision until they learned more about the survey, then finally
to allow individual faculty members to vote once it became evident that the
institution's name would not come into play in announcing any results.
55
The most intriguing and telling debate over professorial activism took
place at Harvard. Throughout the controversy Felix Frankfurter provided an
unlikely voice for restraint. To this day, no one knows for sure whether
Frankfurter personally supported or opposed the plan.5 1 In either case, he was
silent in public and asserted that his colleagues should act likewise. 57 He
became annoyed when friends pushed him to make his opinions known. "I
must confess," he wrote C. C. Burlingham, "that I am a bit puzzled by your
insistence on catapulting me into the political cauldron. Although there are
men like you who are detachedly for or against the Court proposal, it is
inescapably embroiled in partisan politics. For years I have undeviatingly kept
out of the politics of the day."'58 How this position squared with his earlier New
Republic contributions was left unsaid. In any event, the tension between this
position and the outspokenness of his colleagues (not to mention his own
activism) reached a boiling point in early March and triggered a debate that
hinted at the future relationship between legal academia and politics.
The provocation was a memorandum distributed to the Harvard Law
School faculty by Henry Hart, who wrote:
The capacity of members of the Faculty to explore problems and to aid in
their exploration is not helped, it is hurt, when they are pressed not to
explore but to decide. And pressed they are by all polls and widely circulated
statements. This seems to me a chief reason why participation in "such
statements or polls is contrary to the best interests of the School; and why the
Faculty as a body should set its face against the growing tendency to engage in
them.
55. Yale Law School Faculty Minutes (Mar. 18, 1937); Yale Law School Faculty Minutes (Mar. 4,
1937).
56. See Michael Parrish, Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years 268-69 (New York,
1982); H. N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 121 (New York, 1981).
57. Hirsch, supra note 56, at 121-22.
58. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to C. C. Burlingham (Mar. 16, 1937) (Harvard Law School
Library, Charles C. Burlingham Papers, Folder 15, Box 4).
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This memo was a thinly veiled attack on a petition opposing the plan that had
been distributed to the faculty by Samuel Williston (seventeen other profes-
sors signed), and on a statement Edward Warren had made to the Christian
Science Monitor. On March 8, 1937, the faculty came together for its weekly
meeting. At the conclusion of ordinary business, Warren spoke up to address
Hart's memo. He argued that although a law teacher "should be careful to
guard the interests of the School, always remembering that the public is liable
to confuse individuals with institutions," ultimately he was bounded only by
his conscience in speaking out on public questions. This held true, Warren
asserted, even where the issue involved lay outside the field of expertise
entrusted to him by the school. Concerning the present crisis, although
Warren said that in the past he had been "particularly troubled by the
frequent use of this liberty to use the prestige of the School to aid the personal
views of some members of the Faculty on burning public questions" (one
wonders whether he looked directly at Frankfurter as he said this, or just as
deliberately avoided eye contact), the court-packing plan was different be-
cause it "raised an issue which is far deeper than any political, economic or
social issue." Speaking out against the court-packing plan was particularly
appropriate, Warren argued, because it helped dispel the image "throughout
this Country that this School is a School of lawlessness, rather than of law," an
impression created by the activism of Frankfurter and others.59
Williston made the next significant contribution to the debate, in which
more than a dozen people spoke overall. Defending his petition, he told his
colleagues that "whether we describe ourselves as professors or not, everyone
knows we are, and we cannot get away from it. We carry the authority of our
positions under our hat. When I feel I am justified, I feel that I have a right to
speak out with all the power I carry under my hat."6"
Soon after spoke Frankfurter. He made a more moderate argument than
set forth in his letter to Burlingham.61 Instead, he focused on the fact that the
letter's signers had expressly noted they represented a majority of the Harvard
law faculty.62 Frankfurter emphasized that he had never purposefully attached
the school's name to any partisan piece he had written. He said,
[T]o make a statement that 'a clear majority of the Harvard Law School
Faculty support X is consciously to hold out to the public that some special
respect is to be accorded to that body .... We may all carry under our hats the
banner of the Law School, but don't wave the banner. We have a profound
function in American society and we should protect that function. We have a
specialized function-legal education. We should keep it disentangled from
ambiguities, and should not let others use us as allies in other causes.6 3
59. Harvard Law School Faculty Minutes (Mar. 8, 1937) (courtesy of the Harvard University
Archives).
60. Id.
61. Frankfurter, supra note 58.
62. As released to the press, the petition expressly provided that it was being promulgated "by
[the signers] as individuals and not as a resolution of the faculty of the school." 18 at Harvard,
supra note 45.
63. Harvard Law School Faculty Minutes (Mar. 8, 1937).
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The distinction Frankfurter drew between the individual and the institu-
tion merits an aside. After decades of struggle the law school had attained a
reputation for disinterestedness concomitant with membership in the univer-
sity community. But here was an occasion where law teachers wanted to weigh
in individually on what was clearly a "burning public question," and the public
wanted to listen. How could one reconcile a disinterested institution with
partisan professors? Frankfurter's way of solving this problem was to allow
faculty to take public positions on issues with partisan tones, but draw a
dividing line between the individual and the institution-and hope that the
public accepted the whole as greater than the sum of its parts.
This approach may seem obvious in hindsight. Yet it was not so evident at
the time Frankfurter spoke. Not too long before, a strong majority of law
teachers had believed that scholars absolutely should avoid jumping into any
political frays that had a sharp partisan edge. As for the role of the institution,
both Frankfurter and Warren assumed that the law school had become a
sufficiently established part of the research university to act, in the public's
eye, as a nonpartisan counterweight to partisan (or at least politically active)
individual teachers. Just a few decades before, with law schools still struggling
to establish their "scientific" bona fides, this position would have been far less
persuasive. In addition, the previous ten years had witnessed the rise and
decline of legal research institutions that, although designed to be nonparti-
san, were not all that different from the think tanks of today, which of course
often become highly politicized. Likewise,Jerome Frank's ideal of a "clinical
lawyer-school," if accepted and able to flourish, could have transformed the
law school into a vehicle for legal reform. Either of these alternative models
might have caused the "law school" to become a politically charged institu-
tion. Frankfurter's views were partly premised on their failure.
Of course, some of the difficulties involved in distinguishing the individual
from the institution were obvious even then. Just moments after Frankfurter
spoke, Barton Leach noted that "the mere initials 'F. F.' are more closely
identified with the Harvard Law School than is the signature 'W. Barton
Leach, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School."' Like Frankfurter, though,
Leach was ultimately unwilling to deny himself a role in public debates. He
seconded Williston's views on the law professor's influence, saying, "I believe
that the action of the members of the Faculty of signing the statement about
the Supreme Court was perfectly proper .... More weight is attached to the
heads of members of the Law School faculty than to other heads, and it is
proper that this should be so.""'
Although others spoke after Leach, the essential points had been made.
The remarks of Warren, Williston, Frankfurter, and Leach all manifested a
belief that their profession had cultivated significant reputational capital in
the past two generations. The discussion also staked the boundaries of a new
consensus about how this capital could be maintained and even augmented in
the future. Even the conservatives were arguing for activism; Frankfurter's call
for restraint was fatally compromised by his own record. No one was pressing
64. ld.
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for a complete retreat back into Langdell's library. And the type of engage-
ment urged by Warren, Williston, and others was not confined to law reviews,
backroom lobbying, or political service. Instead, it embraced the risks and
opportunities afforded by the American media. The discussion also produced
a consensus that while the individual could speak, the institution should
remain silent. Variants of this basic scheme are generally recognized as the
appropriate model even to this day.65
Frankfurter fully grasped the meeting's importance. Days afterward he
wrote Grenville Clark, "I wish you had been present at a rather full dress
discussion that the faculty had concerning Hart's memorandum. It was an
effort to canvass the function of the School, the role of the faculty, the
reconciliation of our responsibilities to the School with our status as citizens."
But Frankfurter guessed wrong as to the ultimate outcome. "I think it is fair to
say," he wrote Clark, "that probably not six members of the faculty would now
sign such a collective statement."6" Far more prophetic was the fact that Hart-
the instigator of the discussion-would write an article in the April 16, 1937,
Harvard Alumni Bulletin defending Roosevelt's plan, an article later reprinted
in the Congressional Record.17
Roosevelt's court-packing plan ultimately disintegrated. Although the op-
position of men such as Warren and Williston had little to do with its demise,
they probably saw themselves, human nature being what it is, as having played
a part in its downfall. The experience had taught (or, in Wigmore's case,
reminded) them that participation in public controversies was not solely the
province of the profession's liberal wing. The center of gravity in the debate
over whether and how law teachers should contribute to public debates had
shifted. All law teachers now could foresee circumstances in which direct
participation would be useful. And so conservative faculty began to defend,
rather than condemn, their colleagues' outspokenness. In early 1939 the law
faculties of both Harvard and Yale came under attack by the Chicago Tribune
for their allegedly Communist bents." AtYale none other than Arthur Corbin
came to his colleagues' defense. '
65. Other schools also adopted the same framework at around this time. In his annual report for
the 1937-38 academic year, Yale's Clark wrote:
Now I suppose that the more moderate critical view is that [law schools]
should remain neutral. As institutions that is wise and desirable. So far as I
know, that course is pursued generally, as it is with us. The School as such
takes no sides in controversial matters. As individuals, teachers and students
must have views or remain colorless nonentities.
Yale University, Bulletin of Yale University: Supplement to the Issue of 15 October 1938-
Reports of the Dean and Librarian of the School of Law for the Academic Year 1937-38 at
17-18 (1938).
66. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Grenville Clark (Mar. 11, 1937) (Harvard Law School
Library, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Box 184, Folder 2).
67. Henry Hart, The United States Supreme Court: An Argument on the President's Side, Harv.
Alumni Bull., Apr. 16,1937, reprinted in 75 Cong. Rec. 1201 (1937).
68. William Fulton, Reveal Radical Doctrin[e] Taught in Law Schools, Chi. Trib.Jan. 15, 1939,
at 1.
69. See Letter from Arthur Corbin to Justus Chancellor, Jr. (Jan. 20, 1939) (Yale University
Archives, Secretary's Office-Records, Folder 890, Box 214, RU 49, RG 4-A).
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At around the same time as Corbin cleared his throat, however, law teachers'
reactions to another controversy demonstrated some of the tensions inherent
in the new paradigm. In late 1938 a petition implicitly censuring the German
government for Kristallnacht was circulated among American law schools by
the University of Amsterdam's law faculty. Given the petition's substance,
several schools embraced it unanimously and unreservedly.70 This indicated
that the individual/institutional framework was a flexible one, and that schools
could be roused to action where an issue was perceived as going to a profes-
sional commonality-here, an assault on the rule of law. At Harvard, however,
Frankfurter's efforts to compel institutional approval of the petition were
stymied by arguments similar to those he had made just a year before. In a
December 1938 faculty meeting, Frankfurter argued that the school's approval
of the petition was proper because it went to "a matter involving the very fibre
of what an educational institution should be-a body seeking truths and the
principles ofjustice." Frankfurter assumed that all law teachers subscribed to
the principles set forth in the petition; thus a collective statement was proper,
even a professional duty. (Warren, of course, saw opposition to the court-
packing plan the same way.) But Dean Landis and some of the other faculty
perceived the matter differently. They emphasized the divide between indi-
vidual and institutional roles that Frankfurter himself had espoused the year
before, and they chose not to adopt his exception for matters deemed funda-
mental to the profession. In the end, the faculty voted only to notifyAmsterdam
that it was "against the tradition of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School in its
corporate capacity to pass a resolution in regard to matters outside of its
immediate authority." Individual faculty were, of course, allowed to issue their
own statements indicating their support for the petition's message, and to
mention therein that they were Harvard Law School employees."
The debate over the Amsterdam petition suggested that law teachers would
not always agree on where the individual's place ends and the institution's (or
profession's) begins-or, framed slightly differently, whether and when mak-
ing one's opinion public was a professional duty or an individual right. This
issue aside, in the wake of the court-packing controversy well-noticed interven-
tion in (and perceived influence upon) partisan controversies came to be
considered part of a law teacher's professional purpose and one of the keys to
his prestige. Uncertainty as to the law teacher's influence upon the public at
large gave way to a belief that law teachers could and should contribute to
partisan debates, at least in appropriate circumstances. Even the realists, who
had never eschewed dipping into political waters, grew more confident that
professors had a place in partisan tussles.7 2 Take, for example, Dean Leon
70. Graham, supra note 14.
71. Harvard Law School Faculty Minutes (Dec. 6, 1938).
72. Thurman Arnold wrote probably the most famous-and certainly the most witty and astrin-
gent-editorial about the plan. In the midst of the court-packing debate, Arnold ventured
into the lion's den with an article championing Roosevelt's proposal in an A.B.A. Journal
symposium. His piece lampooned the arguments made by other contributors and mocked
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Green of Northwestern. In 1933 Green had espoused a gradualist view of how
his school should go about its business. "I may add that we have not sought any
publicity of the flaunting type," he wrote Northwestern University's president,
Walter Dill Scott. "In fact, we forego many opportunities for the like. Probably
we forego much legitimate publicity. Our desire is to grow into the heart of
the community and gain its appreciation by the meritorious work we do
throughout the years.
'7 3
Five years later, having received a taste of publicity by virtue of his involve-
ment in the court-packing controversy, Green had a different take on how his
school could join the nation's elite. In 1938 he wrote his superiors a lengthy
report setting forth his strategic plan. "If your Law School is to deserve a place
as a national law school it is essential, to my way of thinking," he wrote, "that
the members of its faculty take their parts in the everyday problems of
government." Green wrote that law teachers would partake in this "struggle"
through "participation in public questions." That "public" was code for "politi-
cal," and "participation" meant interaction with the media, was underscored
by Green's warning that a law teacher
should not only be free but encouraged to add whatever he thinks his
professional fitness and duty dictate without fear of repression or criticism
from any authority of the university. A university, of all democratic institutions,
should stand for the fullest and freest expression of views by the members of
its faculty.74
Other professors had come to believe that they had an affirmative responsi-
bility to speak out in order to satisfy public demand for their input. At Yale,
Dean Clark had wrung his hands when asked to appear before the Senate
Judiciary Committee to discuss the court-packing plan. "Although I have been
steadily avoiding all sorts of demands for radio and other public appearances,"
he wrote President Angell at that time, "it did seem to me that I must respond.
For twenty years or more I have advocated constitutional change, and I did not
see how in any honesty I could back out at the last moment."7" Clark never did
appear before the committee. But looking back on the episode, he recognized
practicing attorneys' views of law professors. His editorial's liberal sarcasm played off, instead
of accepting, common criticisms of academics. A typical paragraph follows:
The next big gun to go off is Mr. George Bogert. Mr. George Bogert is a legal
scholar like the writer and not a practicing lawyer. This makes him a little
more cautious in his predictions of disaster because legal scholars are not
closely in touch with the world of affairs and therefore more academic and
less practical. However, Mr. Bogert is convinced on the main issue, and that is
that "he is forced to see in the new plan something subtly immoral and
dishonest ..." Mr. Bogert is, of course, not the kind of man who is willing to
justify immorality of any kind and therefore he is against the plan.
A Reply, 23 A.B.A.J. 364, 366 (1937).
73. Leon Green to Walter Dill Scott (Aug. 28, 1933) (in Green Papers, supra note 53, Folder 2,
Box 27).
74. Leon Green, Statement to Vice President Snyder and His Advisory Committee (1938) (in
Green Papers, supra note 53, Folder 3, Box 29).
75. Charles Clark to James Angell (Mar. 18, 1937) (in Angell Papers, supra note 1, Folder 1243,
Box 120, RU 24, RG 2-A).
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that the sky had not fallen when others did. In June 1937 he would tell his
gathered alumni: "When questions arise which concern [law professors']
immediate fields, in which, if at all, they should be expert, they cannot refuse
the many and continuous demands for expression without ajustified charge
of cowardice or lack of conviction.
76
Epilogue
Fast-forward to the present day and the ongoing discussion over whether
high-profile involvement in politically charged public debates on "burning
public questions," as Warren framed the issue, compromises or enhances law
professors' reputation and utility. Partisan petitions are a matter of everyday
life for the modern law teacher. So too are television and radio appearances,
newspaper and magazine columns, and books directed toward the mass mar-
ket. But now even champions of restraint agree upon a foundational proposi-
tion: "law is not a science."77 Many, perhaps most, law teachers as recently as
the 1920s would not have agreed. Their conception of, and adherence to,
"scientific" legal study left little room or time for the agora. But once "science"
lost its talismanic appeal and even the most conservative law teachers saw some
good in speaking out, the question of engagement inevitably became one of
degree, manner, and form, as it is today.
It has always been plain that law (or more precisely, legal study and
education) is not an art (except, perhaps, to a select few). Thus its practitio-
ners must derive some of their usefulness from something other than the pure
beauty of their insights and constructs. And the recognition that law is not a
science necessarily allows for the possibility that debates will always exist over
what it is and, more crucially, what it should be. If law teachers want to
maintain an important role in society, they must influence these debates.
Much, perhaps most, of that influence has always been exerted obliquely,
through academic writing and, especially, training the next generation of
practicing attorneys, judges, and politicians." Starting in the early 1900s, law
teachers began to contribute more directly to legal reform. Though reflecting
broadened methods, this backroom engagement only modestly enhanced
their public profile. More recently, in the modern era of mass media, profes-
sors have exerted much of their influence through well-noticed intervention
in controversies with a legal, or arguably legal, edge. The difficulty involves
identifying a level and manner of engagement that allow for the greatest
possible exertion of influence without damaging the profession's overall
reputation as a body of truth seekers. The ongoing debate among Devins,
Sunstein, and others about law teachers' involvement in the Clinton impeach-
ment and the controversy surrounding the 2000 presidential election is basi-
cally over where to set this level. That it is being set at all is the result of events
occurring almost seven decades ago.
76. Charles Clark, Address Before the Yale Law School Alumni Association 1 (June 21, 1937)
(transcript available in the Yale University Archives).
77. Devins, supra note 3, at 183.
78. Gordon, supra note 23.
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